"Scholars dispute, and the case is still before the courts." Horace[i]

History books, documentaries, and sensationalized films and docudramas regarding the mastery, monarchy, and mysteries of ancient Rome tend to focus inordinately on the personages and characters of the emperors and military leaders,[ii] but American revolutionary leaders took to emulating some of their conduct and comportment, not to mention a good deal of their public writings, from the great orators, politicians, and leaders of mighty Rome.  

For example, the sublime works of Cicero[iii] frequently were quoted by our American Founding Fathers. Additionally, the pertinent phrases and passages were touted in numerous pamphlets, speeches, and sermons of our Revolutionary War era. Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams both were great admirers of Cicero. Jefferson, for his part, gave much credit to Cicero as one of the former’s major influences during the drafting of the Declaration of Independence.

Monumental Rome unmistakably left her indelible impression despite its later scandalous fall. Think about democratic principles, separation of powers, the design of government buildings, the use of imperial symbols, and, above all, the rule of law. 

Incredibly, from a tiny village in Italy 753 years before the common era, over time, the Romans would come to invade, conquer, and master the Mediterranean world and beyond. Their administrative, cultural, civic, legal, military, political, and public experiences -- both positive and negative -- have provided invaluable lessons to us even now almost three millennia later.

Roman law planted the seeds of civil law and codes, which, over time, shot down its roots and expanded its tendrils to many a nation’s system of jurisprudence. It may not be seriously doubted that the Lex Romana likewise has exerted significant influences on the creation and growth of common law, as conceived, known, and practiced, in the U.S. and U.K. and related countries.    

Turning our focus to arbitration, this aspect of legal procedure and alternate dispute resolution mechanism has been, and remains, of paramount import in many legal cultures. Hearing and deciding disputes, with finality, must be deemed to be a key and vital element of any well-functioning legal system and the administration of justice thereunder. The arbitration process serves to lay a dispute to its final resting place.

The earliest chronicles of arbitration stem not from court reporters but rather from Greek mythology and the Hebraic/Old Testament tradition. The two pertinent accounts that spring spritely to mind are as follows: 1) the “Judgment of Paris” and 2) the “Judgment of Solomon.”

The Judgment of Paris is the ancient Greek myth and legend that motivated Homer[iv] to observe, in his Iliad,[v] that the judgment handed down by Paris was a causus belli [vi]that resulted in Greece’s Trojan War. 

As the story goes, in ancient times, on Mount Ida, the highest summit in Crete, a legendary beauty contest was held. The competing beauties were the Mount Olympus goddesses Hera (the goddess of marriage, women, and family), Athena (the goddess of heroic endeavor), and Aphrodite (the goddess of love, beauty, pleasure, and procreation).

Paris of Troy, the Royal Shepherd, though a mortal being, was selected by the competing goddesses to be the arbitrator who would decide the prize for pulchritude.  The coveted award for the fairest goddess of all was a golden apple brought by Eris, another deity, who had just been snubbed by not being invited to the wedding of Peleus and Thetis. While they say that “it’s not nice to fool Mother Nature,” as it will become readily apparent, it was sheer folly to slight Eris, the Goddess of Discord.

The competition was heated. Nevertheless, as sagely observed by Sean Connery, as the immortal Ramirez in the classic 1986 film, Highlander, “in the end, there can be only one.” As it happened, all three goddesses attempted to bribe Paris. One succeeded. The declared winner was Aphrodite. Such was the Judgment of Paris.[vii] The bribe? The most beautiful mortal woman in the known world, Helen of Sparta. Centuries afterward, Helen’s peerless beauty was the inspiration for one of the most famous lines in Western literature, when she was characterized as “the face that launch’d a thousand ships.”[viii]

The fly in the ointment, besides a duet of displeased goddesses, was that Helen already was married…not to just anyone, but to the King of Mycenaean Sparta, Menelaus. Despite these soap-operatic twists and turns, Paris abducted Helen and carried her off to Troy (believed to have been in present-day Turkey). The jury is divided as to whether Helen willingly “eloped” with Paris. In any event, the Greeks invaded Troy in order to secure Helen’s return. In at least some versions of the story, Helen returned to Sparta with the victorious King Menelaus and they both lived together happily ever after. 

As we have seen, Eris’ “Apple of Discord” served as the causus belli for the Trojan War[ix] which, in turn, ultimately led to the founding of Rome. The Roman nexus to arbitration, thus, ran long and deep. 

And what of the arbitrator, Paris? Detested by the Trojans for having brought upon them the disastrous war, he later treacherously slew the Greek hero, Achilles, but received his comeuppance when he died, by Heracles’ (Hercules’) arrow in the decisive battle for Troy.

Our second ancient arbitral account took place during the reign of King Solomon, the son of King David and Queen Bathsheba, who was the Jewish ruler of ancient Israel (970-931 B.C.).  The Old Testament (i.e., the Hebrew Bible) recounts that two mothers were residing in the same abode, each with an infant son, when one baby sadly was smothered and died. The mothers then disputed the true motherhood of the remaining (living) child and brought their grievance not to a priest, the elders, a high priest, the Sanhedrin, or other Jewish court but rather directly to King Solomon. In that respect, the mothers were looking to their sovereign as an arbitrator for a final and binding resolution of their competing claims to the maternity and custody of the living child. 

King Solomon’s alternative resolution of this dispute is deservedly fabled. Since each woman claimed the infant boy as her own, the king called out for his sword and pronounced his judgment: the baby would be cleaved in two and each woman awarded one half. Even faced with that shocking prospect, one woman did not even challenge the ruling; in fact, she selfishly responded that if she could not have the baby, neither could the other woman. The true mother, in accordance with the dictates of her heart and mind, begged for mercy and told the king to give the baby to the other woman so long as the king did not kill the child. The answer immediately came to King Solomon; the true mother was revealed by her selfless love and devotion to her infant boy. Custody was awarded to the true mother. There was, needless to say, no appeal. The so-called “Judgment of Solomon,”[x] illustrating the king’s extraordinary sagacity, became famous throughout the land of Israel:  “When all Israel heard the verdict the king had given, they held the king in awe, because they saw that he had wisdom from God to administer justice.”[xi]

Above all, the Romans advanced and improved the law (e.g., The Twelve Tables and the Corpus Juris Civilis). Litigation flourished, facilitated by forms and formulas. Roman legal scholars, jurists, and Emperors were astute and pragmatic enough to realize that, often, arbitration might well be the better option in certain cases and given the proper circumstances. 

With the passing decades, scores, and centuries, Roman law budded and blossomed. Litigation was a commonplace, procedures were well-developed, cases were argued by lawyers (though not paid)[xii], and decided by a lay judge, the “judex.” 

In the Roman legal system, the judices were bound by the precedents of the previously handed down edicts by the praetors.[xiii] Stated otherwise, in a trial situation, the judex was constrained by the strict formulas created under the law. As might be expected, in some clear-cut cases, a judex might well be a better option for the parties (or at least one of them; that is to say, the one with the stronger case).

In marked contradistinction, the arbiter (or arbitrator) (we will use the terms interchangeably for purposes of this article) enjoyed, in a considerable measure, the freedom of constraint and a liberated conscience. To illustrate, an arbitrator could augment or diminish a party’s claim. He could also make a judgment based on justice but, at the same time, could base his decision on general principles of humanity and reason. (Think here of equitable principles and maxims.)

As noted, supra, the Romans did not invent the concept of arbitration (arbitratio), but they certainly made a studied attempt to popularize and proceduralize it. As in so many other areas of life and civilization, such as art, culture, philosophy, politics, and religion, the Romans generously borrowed Hellenic law and legal concepts from the conquered Greeks. As early as 400 B.C., the Greeks had been utilizing public arbitration to resolve their thorny inter-city/state disputes (e.g., decisions regarding temple columns). Subsequently, in the fourth century B.C., the ancient Greek philosopher and polymath, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), observed that he favored arbitration over the courts.

It is beyond dispute that the arbitration process was well-established under Roman Law by the first century B.C. The parties in dispute would kick matters into gear by entering into a distinct form of agreement known as a compromissum. This word has been translated to mean the combination of two mutual promises, to wit, to go to arbitration, and to submit to the arbitrator’s award. 

The old tracts by various Roman writers of those times expressly mention arbitration (e.g., Cicero and Seneca). The greatest of all Roman lawyers and orators, Cicero, ostensibly was more favorably impressed by litigation, which he viewed as “exact, clear cut and explicit,” while he tended to downplay arbitration as “mild and moderate.”[xiv] 

Apart from court litigation (where lawsuits for contract breaches, assaults, and slanders were long known), the Romans were well-versed in alternate forms of dispute resolution including, but not limited to, arbitration, meditation, intimidation, and liquidation.  The latter pair of mischievous modalities involved the hiring of “muscle,” often a gladiator, for the purpose of intimidating (or eliminating) one’s enemy or potential litigation opponent. 

In an arbitral forum, there would be less attention paid to the parties’ respective procedural positions and claims, with more focus on the parties’ interests. Above all, however, was the fervent desire to avoid trials. By arbitrating, then, just as today, the parties could steer clear of the court and law trials, have resort to more flexible procedures, maintain privacy, and, in that fashion, conclusively and with finality terminate their disputes. 

Until the third century A.D., court proceedings and arbitration procedures in Rome were private matters. Under Roman law, as reflected in their time-worn documents, arbitrators and arbitration are sometimes interchangeably referred to as “arbitrium,” “arbitrates,” or “arbiterium.” It is noteworthy, however, that the terms “arbiter” and “arbitrator” in those times could not always be used the same way because, for the Romans, an arbiter could also mean a governor or a witness. Legal scholars say that “arbiter” originally meant a witness, while “arbitrator” meant to bear witness.

The individuals turned to in early times to be drafted as arbitrators were by no means jurists (iurisperiti). Instead, they were laypersons selected for their professional and/or personal qualities. They were entrusted with a solitary task, namely, to achieve a final, binding dispute resolution of the controversy before them. 

In Roman society and culture, every “good man” (bonus vir) could be called upon to serve in the role and capacity of arbitrator (arbiter bonus vir). In the event a man was called upon, it was his duty to make himself available as arbitrator and to act faithfully (fideliter) and fairly (aeque) in the performance of his arbitral duties.

The roots were laid down by earlier aspects of Roman litigation. For example, the parties in a garden-variety litigation case would select a person to serve as the judex. This selection process, perhaps, may be viewed at least as a precursor to arbitration.

Arbitration appointments certainly existed under Roman law (lex Romana). Settling disputes through arbitration, then, as now, was significantly different from civil litigation. The arbitration we know today, however, is not patently different. Clearly, in both classical and modern times, one of the main ideas of arbitration was to steer disputants away from the courts and litigation.

Then, as now, for many adversaries, arbitration posed a more attractive, less costly, less complex, more efficient, and more expeditious process. Arbitration, then, also may be characterized fairly as a counter-reaction to the faults and failures of Roman litigation. To illustrate, in the throes of a contentious financial dispute, one might be far better off reposing their trust in the outcome before an arbiter rather than a judex who would apply a stricter, more rigid, and formal legal analysis and decisions. If one needed or desired less complexity, and more flexibility, the arbitration seat was one’s preferred destination.

The ground rules of the arbitration game in ancient Rome were, in large measure, designed by the parties themselves. After all, it was the parties who determined the extent of the arbitrator’s authority (potestas) in a given dispute. The parties would, of course, initially consent to the arbitration, voluntarily, in the form of the compromissum. They would next select the arbitrator. They would agree to the seat of arbitration. If the place of arbitration had not been outlined in the agreement, then the arbitrator would decide the location (locus arbitrium). 

So, too, the parties would elect the language (lingua) to be used. The language of choice was not always Roman; given the geographic girth of the Empire, often, arbitrations were conducted in Carthaginian, Coptic, Egyptian, Greek, Persian, or Phoenician. Although Latin was the official language of the state, the Roman populace was, after all, multi-ethnic, multi-racial, and multilingual. Particularly in the eastern cities, provinces, and towns of the empire, the Greek language, if not other mother tongues, often had to be utilized.  In contrast, court proceedings ordinarily were conducted either in Latin (back in Rome and the West) or (if in the East) in Greek.

The modality of arbitration allowed for the parties to enjoy more freedom and to participate more fully in the adjudicative process. For example, the time and date for hearing(s) would be agreed upon by the parties. Again, if necessary, the arbitrator would decide that issue as well. The overarching idea was to act in a pragmatic and reasonable fashion, affording both the parties and the Arbitrator with sufficient time for their duties and ultimate tasks.

The Roman approach to administration of the law was, overall, quite remarkable. It should be borne firmly in mind that the Roman Empire encompassed expansive geographic borders and had to assimilate diverse cultures. Yet, Rome, for centuries was able to assert order, control, and manage legal disputes between Roman citizens (cives Romani), non-citizen subjects, and foreigners (externi) alike.

Such momentous tasks were greatly aided by the Romans’ perception of the arbitrator who, in fact, could be, and often was, any “good man” that was called upon to assume the role and perform concomitant services. Such good men ably and diligently worked, in many cases, to compromise and settle disputes all over the Roman world (Mundus Romanus).    

Of course, not everyone bowed at the altar of arbitration. Respectfully submitted for your consideration is the following sage (or unwise) advice, depending upon your legal perspective: 

“Never arbitrate. Arbitration allows a third party to determine your destiny. It is a resort of the weak.” 

This anti-arbitration philosophy has been attributed to a famous (or infamous) historical figure associated with Rome. Can you guess which one? 

• Marcus Tulia Cicero
• Julius Caesar
• Atila the Hun
• Emperor Justinian

Atila the Hun, a/k/a “The Scourge of God,” absolute ruler of the Huns from 434 to 453 A.D., may best be remembered for his impressive and lightning string of military conquests and the expansion of the Empire of the Huns across Central and Eastern Europe. Surprisingly, he did not always need to fight. Upon his rise to power, he slyly negotiated a peace with the Romans. Later on, though, when he set his sights on conquering Rome, arbitration or peaceful resolution in any shape or form doubtless was the last thing on Atila’s mind. The result of the fight picked by Atila was an utter bloodbath, backfiring on Atila, and resulting in a Pyrrhic victory for Emperor Valentinian’s General Flavius Aetius and his coalition of Visigoths.[xv]

Rather than stand out as solid proof of Rome’s success, however, many scholars view Atila’s humbling and humiliating defeat more as evidence of the Roman Empire’s degeneration and weakness, its vitality and strength eroded by hundreds of years of imperial mismanagement, corruption, and over-extension of territories. Rome, in the final analysis, erred on many counts (e.g., private armies, taxation, corruption), yet it also must be conceded that it scored many remarkable accomplishments in the fields of architecture, engineering, Roman arches, aqueducts, the Julian calendar, concrete, law, medicine, roadbuilding, welfare programs, and public administration. 

One might well be astounded by some of the core similarities between ancient Roman arbitration and modern arbitration. Many of the cases that were arbitrated, according to ancient source materials, reflects that the subject-matters, legally speaking, frequently involved commercial law, contract, estates, family law matters, inheritance, loans, property, real property, and torts. Now, let us dive deeper into the weeds, so to speak.

The arbitration was, in a legal sense, a personal proceeding. As such, no substitution of parties was allowed. The same rule applied to the arbiter. No one else could be designated to serve. Notably, there were examples of single-party arbitrations (e.g., to determine if a relative’s estate was appropriately handled) and arbitrations involving what we might today refer to as “juridical persons” (e.g., involving a particular tribe or community). Being a “personal” matter, if a party died midstream, the case in arbitration would cease to be.

A party could appear (apparentia)at the arbitration by himself or with a legal advisor (consiliario), not necessarily a lawyer. An advisor could have been any person with special expertise, knowledge, or skills. Also, if a party could not appear in person, they were permitted to send their legal representative to stand in for them; again, we are not talking about lawyers.

In ancient Rome, of course, the lawyer (advocatus) was not a paid advocate. They were good men (bonus vir) who delighted in arguing cases for honor (gloria), prestige (auctoritas), and reputation (fama). They typically hailed from the elite class and were wealthy in their own right.  

The hearing(s) and proceeding(s) before the Roman arbiter were all oral affairs. This made the process decidedly more accessible and understandable to the laypersons involved.

At heart, of course, the proceeding in arbitration was of a decidedly  adversarial nature. Nevertheless, the parties were afforded, more or less, free reign before the arbiter. They could, for example, present their claims, question witnesses and the other party, cross-examine people, make statements and comments, propound questions, present relevant evidence, and make counterclaims and demands. One way to explain the process is to say that the arbitration was a monitored debate exercise between adversarial parties. In practice, the pursuit of the truth (veritas) often led the parties, and the arbiter, down unknown, or unexpected, paths.   

There could be one hearing (audientia) or many amid an arbitration case. Hearings could be held on a single day or in a chain of multiple days (whether consecutive or not). The common denominator was that the hearings were, as a rule, held fast, followed by a rapid-fire decision.  After the final hearing, normally, the award was issued, and the case was thereupon concluded. 

Postponements (dilata) might be allowed and were, in fact, doled out when needed. Generally, however, delay (mora) was frowned upon. The arbiter was endowed with discretion (discretione) in many matters; the timing of the process was just one of them. 

The arbiter also had unbridled latitude to adopt a particular mode of operation for a given arbitration. The arbitrator could, thus, vary his methodology from one proceeding to the next, sometimes wearing different hats, and frequently employing aspects of not only arbitration, but tinges of conciliation (conciliatio), mediation (mediatio), expert authority, and advice as well.  

In yet another analog to modern arbitral procedure, one of the most crucial features of the process was its confidentiality (secreto). Publicity (publicum) was not permitted. In court proceedings, in stark contrast, they were publicly held, and the awards were proclaimed for all to hear. In arbitration, the process would not tolerate the parties, or any of them, being held up to infamy (infamia).

On the other hand, there were several significant differences.  To begin with, once the arbitration agreement was established as valid, all could proceed with the arbitration presided over by an “arbiter ex compromissum.” In the event that the arbitration agreement was not valid, it was deemed void.[xvi] 

Albeit distinct from formal law process under Roman law, the parties to an arbitration were not allowed to waive or preclude the courts’ judicial jurisdiction. Thus, agreements to arbitrate in the future, should a dispute between the parties eventually arise (as is deemed commonplace today) simply were not permitted. That is to say, the parties’ compromissum was only allowed if there was an already existing dispute.

 Yet another quirk in the process was that if the parties were able to work out specific issues or points on their own, those would not be allowed to be incorporated into an arbitral award. Also, there was no appeal (appellatio) from the arbitral award, and one could not resort to a second arbiter with the same dispute. Once the arbitration was resolved, and an award handed down, the arbitral “body” ceased to exist, its duty having been fulfilled and its task completed. There was no longer any jurisdiction (jurisdictio) over the dispute.

Arbiters had to make procedural decisions regularly. Compelling attendance was one problem. The parties would be summoned to appear by the arbiter. This summons (vocatio) would be delivered to the disputants by personal messenger or letter. (Granted postponements were handled similarly.) Needless to say, human nature being what it is, situations arose wherein a party failed to appear for the arbitration hearing(s). In such instances, the arbiters could issue penalties for a party’s non-appearance.

The arbiter’s final decision was pronounced orally (viva voce) and in the presence of the disputing parties. That ceremonial function was essential; without it, there was no valid decision. That formality, legally speaking, sealed the deal. Once the award was announced, the arbiter’s authority evaporated into the ether.

As previously alluded to, no appeals were allowed. In general, the process was designed and implemented to avoid what might be referred to, in modern conversational parlance, as “double-dipping.” In legal circles, we call it “res judicata” and “issue preclusion.” Where there was an identity of parties, and issues and claims, no appeal was supposed to be taken. Further, second arbitrations of the same case and parties were, in theory, likewise were prohibited (prohibitus).

As with all rules, there always are exceptions (exceptiones), just as there are violators. The Roman jurists, ingenious and pragmatic as they were, crafted a workaround for such problems. Remember, paying the award or abiding by the arbiter’s decision was, in a way, like the honor system. It was left to the parties themselves to adhere to the arbiter’s pronouncements. 

If a party to an ended dispute either disregarded or did not make good on an award and/or brought a court proceeding in the identical case, the arbitrator could assess, in effect, a sanction or penalty (“poena compromissa”) on that wayward party. The poena compromissa was conceived and operated to have both a psychological and financial effect on the intransigent or indecorous party. How was that achieved? The arbiter simply would set a much higher amount for the poena than the extant value of the underlying arbitral case. 

An excellent shorter-than-a-book treatment of ancient Roman arbitration procedure may be found in Ivan Milotić’s excellent and informative article, “An outline of the arbitral procedure in roman law,” forum historiae iuris, FHI- Online Journal of Rechtsgeschichte.[xvii] Milotić explains:  

“Roman law took interest in arbitration because it was perceived as a means of dispute resolution which might have considerable advantages to civil litigation which was based on law. Arbitration diverted the disputing parties from excessive civil litigation into various modes of dispute resolution that were considered to be less confrontational. Roman law recognized variety of extra-judicial mechanisms of dispute resolution to ensure that the controversies and differences between the disputing parties were indeed ended. In most cases such different arbitral mechanisms should not be perceived as alternatives to going to court. Evidences on Roman arbitration indicate important reasons that stimulated the parties to go beyond constraints of ordinary jurisdiction for resolving their disputes, conflicts and other differences. Recourse to arbitration was merely a reaction to disadvantages of Roman civil litigation. In certain legal matter the disputing parties were reasoning whether to go to court and to take over many unpredictable risks of civil procedure or, optionally, to use and eventually benefit from practical or psychological advantages of available extra-judicial mechanisms that were adequate means of resolving their dispute. In cases where civil litigation was too complicated (because of formalities and procedural stages), slow, beyond financial power of the disputing parties, risky, considerably subjected to possible risks of excessive claims (pluspetitio) or when civil justice was de iure or de facto inaccessible or unreachable, arbitration is shown as a necessity.3 Furthermore, civil litigation was guided by formal procedures, while arbitration relied on informal ones that were in practice easier to achieve, which promoted its attractiveness and accessibility.

The law has, since Roman times, come an exceptionally long way. After all, however, as the medieval proverb observed, “all roads lead to Rome.”[xviii] Arbitration is still here with us. Arbitration has masterfully endured the tests, trials (iudiciis), and tribulations of time. 

And why not? Around the world, even today, one may still find many marvelous Roman structures still standing including, but not limited to, impressive edifices with tall marble columns and working serpentine aqueducts. So, too, are there many examples of the incredible resilience and longevity of Roman concrete:

“Why are millennia-old ancient Roman piers still standing strong as véritable concrete islands, while modern concrete structures built only decades ago crumble from an onslaught of wind and waves? The answer lies in an until-now undocumented Roman recipe.               

Researchers at the University of Utah discovered that as seawater filters through piers and breakwaters made of age-old Roman concrete, the structures actually become increasingly stronger because of the growth of interlocking minerals – including some minerals that are rare or expensive to cultivate in lab settings…

So why aren’t we using Roman-style concrete? For one, we don’t know the recipe. We may think we’re at the height of human knowledge, but the ancients did possess precious knowledge that has been lost to time.”[xix]

Whether building a court, a temple, a palace, or a sewer, the Romans were focused, determined, diligent, industrious, and successful. For their time, the Romans were sophisticated in many aspects of building. One of their major development projects happened to be the law, a sub-construct of which was arbitration practice.  Thus, Roman ingenuity and innovations should be understood, in a much broader sense, to include the Roman’s construction of the firm foundations of the law, writ large, together with the legal, judicial, and arbitral systems resting upon such concrete pillars.

Thus, here we now stand, long after the destruction of Troy, millennia after the disappearance of Solomon’s Temple, and ages after the work of the Roman arbiters of the ancient empire (imperium antiquum). Arbitration is still here with us; stronger, more vibrant, and more utilized than ever before.

Benjamin Franklin, obviously a devotee of the arbitral process, reportedly inquired: “When will mankind be convinced and agree to settle their difficulties by arbitration?”  It is believed that the question (quaestio) already has been answered.   

A Short-hand Ancient Roman Chronology:

• Legendary founding of Rome (by Romulus) April 21, 753 B.C.
• Roman Kingdom 753–509 B.C. (7 Kings)
• Roman Republic 509–27 BC.
• Twelve Tables- 449 B.C. 
• Lex Canuleia (marriage laws)- 445 B.C.
• Leges Liciinae Sextiae (public land laws)- 367 B.C.
• Position of aedile curule added- 367 B.C.
• Leges Publilae (one of Rome’s 2 Censors must be Plebian) 339 B.C. 
• Lex Ogulnia (priestly offices)- 300 B.C.
• Lex Hortensia (plebian assembly laws)- 287 B.C.
• Lex Aquilia (the root of tort laws)- 286 B.C.
• Special Magistrates (Praetor Peregrinus)(disputes concerning non-Roman-citizens) 242 B.C.
• Julius Caesar- 100 - 44 B.C.
• First Triumvirate (Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus)
• Caesar- Dictator for Life- 44 B.C. (assassinated 15 March 44 B.C.)
• Cicero- 106 - 43 B.C. 
• Second Triumvirate (Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus) 43- 36 B.C.
• Cicero proscribed and murdered- 43 B.C. 
• Marc Antony & Cleopatra (defeat and suicide)- August 30 B.C.
• Octavian (Augustus)(Emperor)- 63 B.C.- A.D. 14 (ruled 27 B.C. to A.D. 14)
• Std form of Praetor’s Edict (Salvius Iulianus) - A.D. 130 or 131
• Institutes (of Gaius)- A.D. 161
• Sextus Poponious (Legal Scholar/Jurist)- 2d c. A.D. (ca. 117-180 A.D.)
• Gaius (Legal Scholar/Jurist)- A.D. 130- A.D. 180
• Papinian (Legal Scholar/Jurist)- A.D. 142- A.D. 212
• Roman Citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire- A.D. 212 
• Ulpian (Legal Scholar/Jurist)- A.D. 170- A.D. 228
• Modestinus (Legal Scholar/Jurist))- ca. A.D. 250
• Paulus (Legal Scholar/Jurist)- A.D. ca. 2d c. and 3rd c.
• Empire split into Western Roman and Eastern Roman parts- A.D. 285
• Codex Gregorianus (summary of legal documents) compiled- A.D. 292
• Codex Hermogenianus (summary of legal documents compiled- A.D. 295
• Theodosian Code (collection of 2,700 Roman laws) is compiled- A.D. 430- 439. 
• Roman Empire 27 BC – A.D. 395
• Western Roman Empire A.D. 286–476
• The Fall of the (Western) Empire: 476 A.D.
• Justinian (Emperor)- A.D. 482- A.D. 565
• Codex Justinianis (summaries of legal documents) compiled- A.D. 528-534
• Institutes (of Justinian)- 533 A.D.
• Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis (Codex Justinianus ; Novellae Constitutiones)- 529 A.D.
• Justinian’s Digest (summary of over 2,000 Roman legal documents) composed- A.D. 533
• Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire- 330 A.D.- 1453 A.D.
• Fall of the Byzantine Empire- 1453. A.D.

Ancient Legal Codes Before Rome:

Code of Ebla (2400 B.C.)

Code of Urukagina (2380–2360 B.C.)

Code of Ur-Nammu, King of Ur (c. 2050 B.C.)

Laws of Eshnunna (c. 1930 B.C.) 

Code of Lipit-Ishtar (c. 1870 B.C.) 

Babylonian law

Code of Hammurabi (c. 1750 B.C.)

Assyrian law (developed c. 1450–1250 BC) 

Law of Moses / Torah/ Jewish religious law (10th–6th century B.C.)

Draconian Constitution (Greek) (late 7th century B.C.)

Solonian Constitution (Greek) (early 6th century B.C.)

Gortyn Code (Greek) (5th century B.C.)

Twelve Tables of Roman Law (451 B.C.)

For Further Reading:

Ando, Clifford. “Fact, Fiction, and Social Reality in Roman Law.” In Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice. Edited by Maksymillian Del Mar and William Twining, 295–323. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015.

Crook, John A. Law and Life of Rome. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.

Crook, John A. Legal Advocacy in the Roman World. London: Duckworth, 1995.

Du Plessis, Paul, Clifford Ando, and Kaius Tuori, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Johnston, David, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Roman Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Kelly, John Maurice. Roman Litigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.Kelly, John Maurice. Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Metzger, Ernest. “An Outline of Roman Civil Procedure.” Roman Legal Tradition 9 (2013): 1–30.

Roebuck, Derek and de Loynes de Fumichon, Bruno, Roman Arbitration. Oxford, England: HOLO Books, The Arbitration Press, 2004

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[i] Horace (65 - 8 BC), Ars Poetica

[ii] Rome was graced (or disgraced) by 76 Roman Emperors, from the time of Caesar Augustus (reign began 27 B.C.) to the denouement of Romulus Augustus (reign ended 476 A.D.)

[iii] Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC – 7 December 43 BC), was a Roman statesman, lawyer, scholar, philosopher, writer, and academic skeptic. Writing extensively on rhetoric, philosophy, and politics, many consider Cicero one of ancient Rome's preeminent orators and prose stylists (“Ciceronian rhetoric").

[iv]  An epic poet from Greece who lived in the eighth century. B.C., he was the author of both The Iliad and The Odyssey. The Iliad and The Odyssey form two important books of the Greek oral literary canon. Twenty-four books and 15,693 lines long, The Iliad was first published in 1488 but not published in English until 1598. Similarly, The Odyssey, 12,109 lines long, was not published in English until 1614.

[v] Iliad, 24:25-30.

[vi] Causus belli (Lat. cause of war) is a term still used today, especially in the contexts of war and litigation, the latter often being dubbed a legalized version of the former.

[vii] The Judgment of Paris was a favorite artistic subject for many classical artists including, but not limited to, Lucas Cranach, the Elder (1528), Peter Paul Rubens (1632-35), Claude Lorrain (1645-46), Jean-Francois de Troy (1720-80), and Enrique Simonet (1904).

[viii] English poet and playwright Christopher Marlowe immortalized this in his work, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, published in 1604. In the play, Faustus is an ambitious man who has decided that necromancy--speaking to the dead--is his sole path to power. Faustus then seals a deal with a demon, Mephistopheles. One of the spirits that Doctor Faustus raises is Helen of Troy. However, inasmuch as he cannot resist Helen’s unparalleled beauty, he makes Helen his paramour and suffers eternal damnation.

[ix] A legendary conflict in Greek myth that supposedly occurred around the 12th or 13th century B.C.

[x] The Judgment of Solomon (a/k/a The Judgement of Solomon) also was an oft-repeated subject for artists from the bygone ages including, but not limited to, Giorgione (1502-05), Franz Floris (1547), Peter Paul Raubens (1617), and Nicolas Poussin (1649). 

[xi] 1 Kings 3:16–28.

[xii] Wealthy, upper-class males advocated for their clients for honor, prestige, and reputation, not to mention being revered by the people as a good man (bonus vir).

[xiii]  “Praetor” is defined as follows: [Latin] 15c) Roman law. The magistrate responsible for identifying and framing the legal issues in a case and ordering a lay judge (judex) to hear evidence and decide the case in accordance with the formula. Praetor, Black’s Law Dictionary 1422 (11TH Ed. 2019). 

[xiv]   Cicero, Pro Roscio Comoedo 4, 5 Roebuck, p.178.

[xv] At the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains (a/k/a Battle of Châlons), in Northeastern France, on June 20th 451 A.D., an alliance of Roman soldiers and Germanic tribes finally stopped Atila in his tracks. 

[xvi] Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum; what is void produces no legal effect.

[xvii] https://forhistiur.net/2013-01-milotic/

[xviii] During Rome’s history, a vast network of roads was constructed measuring more than 250,000 miles (400,000 km).

[xix] Laurie L. Dove, We Finally Know Why Ancient Roman Concrete Outlasts our Own, How Stuff Works, February 27, 2024, https://science.howstuffworks.com/why-ancient-roman-concrete-stronger-than-modern.htm